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Abstract
We apply the old concept of financial repression, originally due to
Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), to the Chinese financial system and
argue that it might explain the country’s current account surplus. In
a two-country model, we show that financial repression in one country
(China), modeled as a tax on domestic investment, would drive capital out
and render its trading partner (US) with tax-arbitrage opportunity that is
used to fund the latter’s current-account deficit. Calibration demonstrate
that the effect is quantitatively significant. In contrast to a common
view, this intervention would decrease wages, employment and welfare in
the financially-repressed country.
∗Said business school and University of Oxford.
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”I will label China as it is, a currency manipulator....”
Mitt Romney, Republican Presidential Debate, October 11th, 2011
Imbalances have been one of the most distinct characteristics of the global
economy. The United State had a current-account deficit of around 4.4% of
its GDP in 2010, and an accumulated negative position of Net Foreign Assets
(NFA) of $2.5 trillion, or 16.8% of its GDP. At the same time, China had a
substantial current-account surplus of around 4.94% of its GDP and an ac-
cumulated reserves of $3.5 trillion, or 58% of its GDP. This is puzzling since
standard theory predicts that capital would flow from the developed countries,
where it is abundant, to the developing countries, where it is scarce. A popular
explanation to the phenomenon is that the reversion is a result of “currency
manipulation” by the Chinese government, in breach of free trade agreements.
In a recent paper, Mendoza, Quadrini and Rois-Rull (2009), henceforth
MQR, argue that the root cause of the imbalance may be found in the capital
market rather than in the foreign-exchange (FX) market. In their two-country
model, the developed country has an advantage over the developing county in
contract enforcement. For example, it is cheaper to enforce a contract between
an American citizen and a Chinese citizen relative to a contract between two
Chinese citizens. Weak contract enforcement increases the probability that the
borrower would divert cash to his own private benefit, which reduces the insur-
ance value of the contract and causes, in equilibrium, a net capital outflow from
the costly-enforcement country towards the cheaply-enforcement country.
Our work elaborates and further-develops the MQR argument. Like them,
we argue that the root problem is to be found in the capital market rather
than the in FX market. Yet, we model the structural difference between devel-
oped and developing countries using the old concept of “financial repression”,
developed by Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). In an open-economy DSGE
framework, we model the excessive regulation of the capital market as a finan-
cial intermediation tax, which gives rise to a large spread between the lending
rate and the borrowing rate (in the developing country). Crucially, we assume
that investors from the developed country, can arbitrate the intermediation tax
when investing in the developing country. As a result, they build a substantial
NFA position and use the rent created by the tax arbitrage in order to fund
a permanent current account deficit. At the same time, domestic investors in
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the developing country are crowded out of their home market and accumulate
a large NFA position in the developed country.
While similar in spirit to MQR, our approach adds to their argument in two
important respects. First, financial repression is an observable phenomenon.
That resolves an issue in the MQR approach which finds it “difficult to derive a
direct mapping from these indicators [namely, the model parameters that cap-
ture the cost of contract enforcement] to the actual values [of those parameters]”.
We calibrate our model using data of Chinese reserve requirements, which are
at extraordinarily high level of above 30%, to show that it yields a significant
order of magnitude of current-account imbalances. Our model predicts that in
equilibrium, with a gross foreign asset of 186.3%, and gross foreign liability of
168.9% of its GDP, developed country runs a negative NFA around 17.4% of its
GDP. On the other hand, the yield of developed country’s foreing asset, 13.2%
is 2.04% higher than that of its foreign liability, 11.1%. Those number results in
a positive capital account of (168.9%*13.2%-186.3%*11.1%=)1.61% of its GDP.
That is enough to fund a permanent current-account deficit of 1.57% of its
GDP in our model. Second, since financial repression is a policy variable, wel-
fare accounting seems to be the right approach to evaluate it. It turns out that
financial repression decreases the level of capital stock in the developing country
and, as a result, its labor income. In contrast with much currency-manipulation
rhetoric, the actual winners of the financial-repression are the investors and the
labor in the developed country, not those in the developing one. The aggre-
gated welfare loss relative to the no financial repression regime indicates the
social sub-optimal nature of this policy.
Literature
Another line of DSGE models attempts to explain the international imbal-
ances as a result of differences of risk exposure across developed-developing coun-
tries, which generate precautionary savings of the later, see Bernanke (2005) as
an example. Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) argue developed countries are
populated with investors of a higher tolerance for risk and monopolize the cre-
ation of risk-free assets1. That creates a strong insurance motive to trade across
the developing-developed countries and at the same time allocates the developed
1Regarding that asymmetric supply of assets see also Caballero, Farhi and Gourin-
chas(2008).
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country some rent that can be used to fund a permanent trade deficit. Fogli,
Alessandra, and Perri (2006) explain the higher demand for insurance in the
developing countries on a more erratic business cycle there while Durdu, Bora,
Mendoza and Terrones (2009) attribute that phenomenon to a higher likelihood
of being affected by a sudden-stop type of financial crisis. See however some
skeptical notes by Jeanne (2007) regarding this approach. The closest paper
to our approach is Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011). They emphasize the
dual nature of the Chinese capital market by assuming that State-Owned Enter-
prises (SOEs) have exclusive access to Chinese banks that decline loan requests
from private enterprises. As the SOE sector shrinks due to low productivity, the
banks accumulate surpluses that only can be directed abroad. Again, our main
contribution of this paper is in being able to calibrate the financial imperfection
on observable data.
1 Financial repression in China
The term financial repression is introduced by Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973), henceforth MS, to describe the excessive regulation of financial mar-
kets. Originally, MS focused their analysis on a market where i) a concentrated
banking industry dominates any other forms of financial intermediation and ii)
the government puts a ceiling on the time-deposit rate. In such circumstances,
the supply of funds, fs, turns inelastic at the quantity where the ceiling rate
binds, a level smaller than the un-repressed equilibrium lending f0; see Figure
1. The main observable implication of financial repression is an exceptionally
high spread between the risk-free borrowing rate id and the risk-free lending
rate is. As a result, financial repression can be modelled by an intermediation
tax, τ = id − is, with the equivalent equilibrium effect. The main objective of
the policy is to lower the cost of servicing the national debt. Eventually, the
concept was used in the literature to describe various other regulatory measures
that, likewise, generate exceptionally-high credit spreads2. We use, below, the
concept of financial repression to describe the Chinese financial market, with
a special emphasis in i) its dominating and SOE-biased banking sector and ii)
exceptionally-high reserve requirements. We then demonstrate that financial
repression, by causing pervasive credit deprivation among SMEs, is equivalent
to a 20% tax on domestic investment3.
2Brock (1984, 1989) analyze reserve requirements’ effect on the interest rate wedge.
3we refrain from speculating on Chinese government’s motivation in implementing financial
repression. Bai et. al. (1999) modelled financial repression in China as an implicit way
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Figure 1: Financial Repression
Chinese commercial banks dominate its financial sector in terms of scale and
functionality. By 2010, The total bank asset, which exceeds 11.7 Trillion USD
or 200% of Chinese GDP, more than double the sum of Chinese stock markets’
capitalization and corporate bond outstanding. More than 90 percent of ex-
ternal funding to Chinese corporation is channelled by commercial banks. The
banking sector is highly concentrated: the top 4 state-owned banks possess more
than 47 percent of total asset and generate more than half of total revenues of
the whole sector4. Chinese banks are also highly biased in favor of SOEs whose
political connection and government’s implicit guarantee help putting these un-
productive corporations in front of credit queue (see Genevieve Boyreau-Devray
and Wei, 2005). SOEs contribute 25% of Chinese GDP but receive 65% of total
bank loans (see also Pitsilis et al., 2004).
Chinese commercial banks face a labyrinth of reserve requirement measures
and (sometimes implicit) administrative orders. The official reserve requirement
ratio (reserve/deposit) was raised from 6% in 2002 to 21% in 2011, see Figure
2. A requirement for loan to deposit ratio, hencefore LTD ratio, which has
been strictly implemented since 2005, imposes a ceiling on loanable capital as
percentage of total deposit, which reached, by 2011, 65% for the “big four”
banks5 and 75% for other banks, equivalent to a roughly 30% reserve ratio.
On top of the formal regulations, implicit intervention by the authorities in the
to extract taxation revenue from savings. Li (2001) argued that financial repression is an
indispensable tool to maintain financial stabilization during reform period. Likewise, Reinhart,
Kirkegaard, Sbrancia (2011) attribute financial repression to “government efforts to ensure the
health of an entire financial system”.
4Data from People’s Bank of China (PBC), 2010.
5Chinese government set individual LTD ratio for each ”big-four” bank for each year. By
the end of 2011, LTD ratios for ”big four” banks range from 57% (Agriculture Bank of China)
to 72% (Bank of China) with average value of 65%, equivalent to a 35% reserve ratio.
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banks’ asset management, known as “windows guidance”, may further limit the
capability of banks of generating credit6. Though reserves and other low-interest
bonds are far less profitable than loans (usually negative real interest rate),
banks are holding more than 30% of deposit in the form of those low-yield
assets (also see Figure 2). This indicates that above policies impose a binding
constraint that greatly distorts asset allocation behaviors of Chinese banks; its
65% loan-to-deposit ratio is not only more than 30% lower compared with its
un-repressed level (90%) in 1998 before LTD ratio requirement came in to effect
but also significantly short of its US (85%) or Europe(114%) counterparts.
Figure 2 Required and Actual Reserve Ratio as Percentage of Total
Deposit
Data resource: People’s bank of China
Since financial repression brings about a reduction in the total volume of
credit, Chinese non-SOEs firms, which tend to be more productive and prof-
itable7 than SOEs, suffer from pervasive credit deprivation. In a “Chinese En-
trepreneur Group Financing Need Survey”, which sampled more than one thou-
sand SMEs all over the country, 41% of respondents had no formal external
finance at all. For those who do have access to bank finance, loans are usually
short-term working capital (80% mature in less than one year), and account for
6Chines central government is the controlling shareholder for majority of Chinese commer-
cial banks, which therefore always put political needs before economic interests. See Lin Cai
and Li (1998) and Bai et al (2000). In a recent paper, Deng, Morck, Wu and Yeung (2011)
argue that government intervention is the reason to Chinese banks’ great credit expansion
and Chinese economic boost in 2009.
7See Islam, Dai and Sakamoto (2006) and Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (2008) for difference in
total factor productivity between SOE and non-SOE enterprises.
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only a small portion of their total asset8. More than 61.9% of respondents claim
that their expansion of business is limited by the absence of external financing
channels. That is consistent with a finding by Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) who
show that non-SOEs have to internally finance 60% of their investments. The
credit deprivation is also suggested by China’s growing private lending:9 12% of
Chinese households lend and 33% borrow on “gray” markets10, many of whom
are entrepreneurs raising capital for their SMEs. Interest rates for private lend-
ing soar as high as four times of base interest rate (see Tsai, 2002 and Farrell
et al. 2006).
The above discussion shows that compared with un-repressed situation, re-
pressed Chinese banking system creates at least 20% less loans than could be
used to finance profitable projects of non-SOE enterprises. Considering the
dominating role of Chinese banking sector in capital intermediation, that is
equivalent to an approximately 30% tax on Chinese domestic investment, one
key parameter we will use in the calibration exercise.
Financial repression leads to a simultaneous capital import and capital ex-
port. Foreign funds, which are raised abroad and exported to China, provide
an tax-arbitrage opportunity and retain a higher rate of return11. Capital flows
into China are in the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment;
the former amounted to 1.95 trillion USD (23% of Chinese GDP) in 2012 and
made China the top FDI destination and the latter, usually referred to as ”hot
money”, is likely to be of the same order of magnitude12. As for capital export,
there is much anecdotal evidence of wide-spread (illegal) capital flight away from
China so as to benefit from investment opportunities abroad: illicit capital out-
flows that are hidden in current-account terms are estimated to be 8% of Chinese
GDP13. For the sake of the argument, we assume that cross-border capital flows
are costless. In order to explore quantitative effect and welfare implication of
these capital flows, we turn to the modelling and calibration exercise.
8for more than half enterprises bank loans are account for less than 10 percent of their
total liabilities.
9Chinese law stipulates that any private borrowing from more than 30 people could be
charged by “illegal-fund raising”, a offense with highest maximum penalty death.
10“Chinese Household Finance Survey” is the first national-wide survey on household fi-
nance. It collect data from more than 8000 households from over 25 (out of total 34) provinces.
11See Sun, Yang and Xiao (2010) for evidence that foreign investor gains a higher rate or
return for their Chinese investment relative to domestic investors.
12The non-FDI inflow is estimated between 500 billion and 1.75 trillion USD, see Li (2008),
Zhang (2008) and Setser (2008). Those scholars use the differential between increment of
foreing reserve and the sum of trade surplus and net FDI inflow to estimate the non-FDI
inflow into China.
13See Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2009), Schneider (2003) and Sicular (1998) who use the
differences between export value reported by Chinese and import value reported by China’s
trading parters to estimate the capital inflow hidden in current account.
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Many real estate company choose to raise capital from Hong Kong market
when Chinese central government tighten the monetary policy. Foreign capitals
control more than 15% of total house value of China.
2 The DSGE model
Consider a world with two countries,i = ch,us, where ch stands for the finan-
cially repressed economy. Each country is populated by a single, infinitely lived,
representative agent with a Von-Neuman Morgenstern CRRA utility function:
U i =
∞∑
t=0
βtEu(cit), u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ ,
where β is the subjective discount factor and σ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, same for both countries.
Two factors, labor and capital, are used to produce one type of divisible
commodity that can be used for either consumption or investment. Each repre-
sentative agent is endowed with one unit of labor. He chooses the total amount
of investment s and the proportion α of investment which is allocated towards
the domestic market. The total capital received by country-i in period t is from
both agents’ allocations of capital in that country:
kit = s
i
tα
i
t + s
j
t (1− αjt ),
where j 6= i. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labour and a Cobb-Douglas
production technology f(k) = kν , affected by a random productivity shock with
a Markov transition process zt+1 = g(zt). Hence, per-capita output in country-i
in period t is:
yit = z
i
tf(k
i
t−1) = z
i
t(k
i
t−1)
v.
Where ν is the out elasticity of capital. Agent-ch’s domestic investment is
subject to a tax so that the interest rate he earns is lower than his MPK by τ
percent. The tax revenue is rebated to country-ch agent’s as a lump-sum trans-
fer. In contrast, agent-us can arbitrate the tax: the return on his investment in
country-ch equals to MPK. Both agents’ investments in US are tax-free so their
interest rate equals to MPK in country-us.
Each agent’s total income ait consists of labor income w
i
t, capital income CI
i
t
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and tax rebate Tt (only for agent-ch). Labor income is the total production net
the capital returns:
wit = f(z
i
t, k
i
t−1)− ritkit−1,
where rit is the marginal productivity of capital (MPK).
rit = f
′
k(z
i
t, k
i
t−1) = z
i
t(k
i
t−1)
v−1.
The capital income for each agent is defined as: CIit = s
i
t−1R
i
t, where R
i
t is
the effective weighted average rate of return for agents’ global portfolios. For
agent-ch:
Rcht = 1 + α
ch
t−1r
ch
t (1− τ) + (1− αcht−1)rust .
For each period, each agent’s total income are put into usage of either con-
sumption or investment. Thus, the budget constraint of agent-ch is:
acht = w
ch
t + CI
ch
t + Tt = c
ch
t + s
ch
t , (1)
where Tt = α
ch
t−1s
ch
t−1r
ch
t τ is the tax refund to the economy. Notice that when
taking the first-order condition, we treat rit as exogenous in line with the price-
taking behavior of the agent-ch (Same for agent-us later). The first-order condi-
tions with respect to investment scht and domestic allocation α
ch
t , after plugging
in equilibrium interest rate from equation (1), are:
u′(ccht ) = βE[R
ch
t+1u
′(ccht+1)] (2)
E[(rcht (1− τ)− rust )u′(ccht )] = 0 (3)
Correspondingly, for agent-us the effective weighted average rate of return is:
Rust = 1 + α
us
t−1r
us
t + (1− αust−1)rcht .
In period t the agent-us’s budget constraint and first order conditions with
respect to investment sust and domestic allocation α
us
t are:
aust = w
us
t + CI
us
t = c
us
t + s
us
t (4)
u′(cust ) = βE[R
us
t+1u
′(cust+1)] (5)
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E[(rcht − rust )u′(cust )] = 0. (6)
The set of aggregate states ω consists of the current total incomes ait and
previous productivities zit−1of both countries. Therefore, ω
i
t = {ait, zit−1}(i =
ch, us).
Definition: The recursive equilibrium is characterized by a set of functions
for (i) agents’ policies cit(ω), s
i
t(ω) and α
i
t(ω); (ii) price r
i
t(ω). Such that (i)
agents’ policies satisfy the optimality conditions (3),(4),(6),(7) given the interest
rate rit(ω) and the law of motion for aggregate states ω
i
t+1 = H(ω
i
t) ; (ii) the
interest rates rit(ω) are the market clearing prices that equal to the MPK for
each country (borrowing rate in country-ch).
3 Calibration
We now calibrate the model to see whether a financial-repression parameter
of τ = 30%, in line with the empirical observations made above, actually pre-
dicts orders of magnitude of the developed country’s negative NFA and current-
account deficit. We also make the standard assumptions that β = 0.9 and
v = 0.3. We set up σ = 10. This is higher than the commonly-assumed level,
but in the current setting can be justified on the basis that it captures a home
bias: at low levels of relative risk aversion, agents will take advantage of the
arbitrage opportunity much more aggressively, cross-holding almost the entire
market of their trading partner. The country-specific productivity shocks are
independent with standard deviations of 3%. Therefore, there is scope for in-
ternational diversification of country-specific shocks. Table 1 summarizes above
parameters.
Table 1 Parameters for Calibration
Parameters Value
subjective discount factor (β) 0.9
risk averse coefficient (σ) 10
output elasticity of capital (v) 0.2
s.d. of productivity shock (ε) 3%
tax rate (τ) 30%
We implement Parametrized Expectation Algorithm (PEA), an algorithm
first proposed by Marcet (1988) to solve the heterogeneous-agent DSGE model;
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see Appendix for more details. Calibration results and corresponding actual
magnitudes are presented in Table 2. Evidently, the calibrated model predicts,
reasonably well, the phenomenon that we try to explain. The model predicts
that in the long run, the foreign asset and foreign liability of country-us are
186.3% and 168.9% of its GDP, repsectively14, leaving a negative 17% of net
foreign asset. The yield of US’s foriegn asset, 13.2%, is 2% above the yield
of its foriegn liability, 11.1%. This render a positive capital account of US of
(168.9%*13.2%-186.3%*11.1%=) 1.61% of its GDP. That is more than enough
to cover US’s current account deficit, which is 1.57% of its GDP. This prediction
is consistent with ”Exorbitant Privilege” of US, one phenomenon that over the
last 50 years, interest income of US’s smaller foreign asset exceeds the interest
expenditure of its larger foreign liability, leaving a positive net capital income.
Table 2 Positive Prediction: US’s Balance of Payment in long run
equilibrium
(a) Forieng asse,t foreign liability, Net foreign asset, current account and capital account are all
measured by percentage of GDP. (b) Estimations used in this column are from Gourinchas and
Rey (2007)
Description Model calibration values Empirical value
Gross Foreign Asset (a) (1− αust−1)sust−1/yust 168.9% 100%(b)
Gross Foreign Liability (1− αcht−1)scht−1)/yust 186.3% 75%
Net Foreign Asset ((1− αust−1)sust−1 − (1− αcht−1)scht−1))/yust −17.4% −25%
Yield on Foreign Asset (YFA) rcht 13.2% 5.72%
Yield on Forieng Liability (YFL) rust 11.1% 3.61%
YFA-YFL rcht − rust 2.04% 2.11%
capital account ((1− αust−1)sust−1rcht − (1− αcht−1)scht−1rust ))/yust 1.61% [0.09%, 1.2%]
current account (yust − cust )/yust −1.57% [−2.8%,−5.7%]
14 The number is higher than the standard reported value which we believe under-estimates
the actual scale of international position of US. Gros (2006a) point out that the foreign
liability data of US is probably larger. For the survey of foreign portfolio investment, only
those securities held by a US-based custodians are included, missing all securities held by
foreign-based contodians. This may also cause a tax-avoid motivated transfer from a surveyed
US-based custodians to unsurveyed foreign-based contodians, which may be reflected in a 400
billion USD fall by the end of 2000. Mostover, acquisitons by foreigner of US’s real estate is
not accounted at all due to lack of data resource. Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2007) believe
that the US’s foreign asset is under-estiamted asset well because of commonly used measure
of foreign direct investment (FDI) only account for its book value, which could be greatly
different from its market value.
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Table 3 shows that financial repression has significant welfare implications.
Compared with a un-repressed situation, country-ch loses while country-usmea-
sured by of GDPconsumption and total welfare. All loses and gains are econom-
ically significant. It indicates that great welfare is transferred from country-ch
to country-us via the net capital flow driven by financial repression. The shifts
in welfare are also universal across classes as within each country the capital
income, main resource for the better-offs, and the labor income, main resource
for the worse-offs, experiences similar changes. In contrast with prevailing view
that Chinese employees benefit from the export boom15, our model predicts that
Chinese employees are worse off: labor income declines by 2.4 percent resulting
from declined the capital stock per unit of labor and correspondingly reduced
labor productivity. Also note that the welfare loss of country-ch is more than
the welfare gain of country-us, suggesting the financial repression is socially
undesirable.
Table 3 Normative Analysis: welfare increment of Repressed regime
(R) relative to Un-Repressed (UR) regime
Model CH US
GDP (yit)
R/(yit)
UR − 1 −2.75% 4.6%
labor income (wit)
R/(wit)
UR − 1 −1.3% 6.1%
capital income (CIit)
R/(CIit)
UR − 1 −5.8% 1.25%
consumption (cit)
R/(cit)
UR − 1 −4.6% 6.4%
welfare gain (U i)R − (U i)UR −0.85 0.70
4 Discussion
This simple model draws attention to the possibility that financial repression
in China causes international trade imbalances. The question remains open is
why China, with small government debt and little need to levy inflation tax,
implement financial repression that decrease its own welfare.
Future research may benefit from exploring political-economy channels that
are masked by our representative agent assumption. Stigler (1971) propose that
regulations are actively sought by the industries which would potentially bene-
fit from being regulated. Although Chinese commercial banks losses for having
15As Mitt Romney put it in his campaign for US president in 2012,” China...have 20 million
people coming out of farm... and they want to be able to put them to work...but they cannot
artificially lowering their prices and killing American jobs”.
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less loanable funds, they could gain more from the artificially augmented loan-
deposit spread brought about by financial repression, see lardy (2008). That
may encourage banks to support such a regulation to sustain their economic
interest at the cost of labor and the rest of the society.
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Appendix: Calibration Procedure
In this section, we will describe the calibtarion procedures in detail. We
use the Marcet (1988) method of Parameterized Expectation Algorithm(PEA)
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to solve the DSGE model. The idea of PEA is to choose a flexible form of
function ϕ with a set of parameters δ to approximate the conditional expections
in the stochastic growth model. By solving the parameters δ with iteration, the
substitute function ϕ approaches the conditional expections arbitrarily well.
The policy functions contained in the Euler equation is solved simutaineously.
The state variables of this model are the current total incomes of each agent
acht ,a
us
t and last period productivity shocks z
ch
t−1,z
us
t−1. We choose the linear
function:
ϕk(acht , z
ch
t−1, a
us
t , z
us
t−1; δ
k) = δk1 + δ
k
2a
ch
t + δ
k
3z
ch
t−1 + δ
k
4a
us
t + δ
k
5z
us
t−1
to approximate four Euler equations (3),(4),(6) and (7) derived from the utility-
maximization problems, where k=1,2,3,4. The main advantage of linear func-
tion over power function (used by Haan and Marcet (1990)) is that it gives
the model extra stability during the iteration process. Only first-order linear
approximation is implemented. The system of Euler equations after conditional
expectation replaced by ϕ can be writen as:
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The parametersδk of parameterized function ϕk is achieved with the follow-
ing iteration procedures.
Step 1: Generate a series of shocks {zit−1}Tt=2, i = ch, us.
Step 2: Make an initial guess of δk .
Step 3: Calculate the linear approximation of conditional expectation func-
tion: {ϕkt (acht , zcht−1, aust , zust−1; δk)}Tt=2. Use the ϕkt to derive consumption and in-
vestment decisions {sit(δk), αit(δk)}Tt=2. Use those policy function to update the
future expected total income based on investment decisions {(acht )′, (aust )′}Tt=2.
Step 4: Caltulate the new approximation using new total income {ξkt ((acht )′, zcht−1, (aust )′, zust−1)}Tt=2.
Update δk with regression:
δk = argmin (ξk − ψk(δk))2.
Step 5: Repeat step 3 and 4 until δk converge.
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